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Non-technical summary 
The management of global environmental resources, such as the global climate, 
requires cooperation between countries. In practice, countries willing to abate the 
emission of a pollutant that damages a shared environmental resource often cooperate 
in international environmental agreements (IEA). The essential feature of IEAs is that 
they must be self-enforcing because sovereign countries cannot be forced to sign an 
IEA. The theoretical literature on self-enforcing IEAs derives rather pessimistic 
predictions. If potential cooperative efficiency gains, and thereby free-riding 
incentives, are large, a self-enforcing IEA can attract only few signatories and 
marginally improve upon the non-cooperative outcome. Efficiency gains may be 
possible if an IEA does not require the collectively optimal abatement level from its 
signatories and thereby appeals to more participants. 
The theoretical literature, however, has not paid so much attention to the question how 
signatories determine their pollution abatement level. Also, the experimental literature 
on coalition formation which is still at the beginning does not explicitly consider the 
negotiation process. Most experiments prompt the signatories to abate the optimal 
amount. The present paper tries to narrow this gap. It experimentally analyses the 
effects if signatories to an IEA apply different voting schemes to determine the terms 
of agreement. To this end, unanimity, qualified majority voting, and simple majority 
voting are compared with respect to the resulting pollution abatement level and social 
welfare. At first sight in line with theoretical predictions, the experiment shows that a 
change of the voting scheme implemented in an IEA does not significantly change 
social welfare. However, changing the majority required to determine the terms of an 
IEA alters the ‘depth and breadth’ of cooperation. The coalitions under the unanimity 
rule are relatively large and implement moderate effort levels while the coalitions 
with majority votes implement very high effort levels but attract only few 
participants. 
 
Das Wichtigste in Kürze 
Der Schutz globaler Umweltressourcen erfordert länderübergreifende Kooperation. 
Diese wird in der Praxis oft in internationalen Umweltabkommen festgelegt. Das 
zentrale Element internationaler Umweltabkommen ist, dass sie den Ländern Anreize 
bieten müssen, die Abkommen zu unterzeichnen und einzuhalten, da kein souveräner 
Staat dazu gezwungen werden kann. Die spieltheoretische Literatur zu internationalen 
Umweltabkommen, die diese Abkommen als ‘selbstdurchsetzend’ bezeichnet, liefert 
pessimistische Prognosen: Sind die potenziellen Kooperationsgewinne und damit 
auch die Freifahreranreize hoch, haben nur wenige Länder einen Anreiz dem 
Kooperationsabkommen beizutreten. Effizienzgewinne sind in begrenztem Umfang 
möglich, wenn ein Abkommen statt dem kollektiv optimalen Umweltschutzniveau ein 
suboptimales Niveau von seinen Mitgliedern verlangt und damit mehr Unterzeichner 
gewinnen kann.  
Die theoretischen Arbeiten haben jedoch der Frage, wie sich Länder auf ein 
bestimmtes Umweltschutzniveau einigen, wenig Aufmerksamkeit geschenkt. Auch 
die experimentelle Literatur im Bereich der Koalitionsbildung betrachtet oftmals nicht 
den Verhandlungsprozess sondern erzwingt das optimale Verhalten der 
Koalitionsmitglieder. Die vorliegende Arbeit versucht diese Lücke zu verkleinern. Sie 
betrachtet im Rahmen eines Laborexperimentes verschiedene 
Kooperationsabkommen, in denen Unterzeichner unterschiedliche Wahlsysteme 
anwenden, um das Umweltschutzniveau innerhalb des Abkommens festzulegen. 
Einstimmigkeit, qualifizierte Mehrheitsentscheidung und einfache 
Mehrheitsentscheidung werden im Hinblick auf Umweltschutzniveau und soziale 
Wohlfahrt verglichen. Auf den ersten Blick im Einklang mit den theoretischen 
Prognosen hat das zugrundeliegende Wahlsystem keinen signifikanten Einfluss auf 
die soziale Wohlfahrt. Die detaillierte Analyse zeigt jedoch, dass das Wahlsystem die 
‘Tiefe und Breite’ des Kooperationsabkommens ändert. Während Einstimmigkeit zu 
relativ großen Koalitionen mit moderatem Umweltschutzniveau führt, erzeugen 
Mehrheitsentscheidungen kleine Koalitionen mit sehr hohem Umweltschutzniveau. 
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Abstract 
This paper experimentally analyzes the effects if signatories to an international 
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1. Introduction 
The management of global environmental resources, such as the global climate, 
requires cooperation between countries. In practice, countries willing to abate the 
emission of a pollutant that damages a shared environmental resource often cooperate 
in international environmental agreements (IEA). In the game theory literature, IEAs 
are usually modeled as an n-country dilemma game with multiple stages. In the first 
stage, all countries choose whether to be a signatory to an IEA or not. In the second 
stage, signatories determine their emission abatement levels with the objective of 
maximizing their collective payoff. In the third stage non-signatories choose their 
abatement levels independently with the goal of maximizing their individual payoff. If 
the underlying game involves dominant strategies, the final two stages could also be 
turned into a single stage because signatories cannot influence the behavior of the 
non-signatories by choosing a certain action. The essential feature of IEAs is that they 
must be self-enforcing because sovereign countries cannot be forced to sign an IEA. 
This feature is incorporated by the concept of internal and external stability. An IEA 
is internally stable if no signatory would like to leave the agreement unilaterally. It is 
externally stable, if no non-signatory would like to join the agreement unilaterally. 
The IEA literature (e.g. Barrett 1994, Hoel 1992, Carraro and Siniscalco 1993) that 
was inspired by theories of cartel formation (e.g. d’Aspremont et al. 1983) derives 
rather pessimistic predictions. If the difference in payoffs between the non-
cooperative and full cooperative outcome is large, only few countries are predicted to 
form a self-enforcing IEA. The reason is that the free-rider incentives increase with 
the number of participants. Consequently internal stability is already violated for a 
small number of signatories. Hence, a self-enforcing IEA can only marginally 
improve upon the non-cooperative outcome. Finus and Maus (2008) suggest that an 
IEA can attract more participants by lowering the emission abatement required from 
the signatories. That is, an IEA that does not maximize the collective payoff by fully 
internalizing mutual benefits of the signatories but only partially internalizes benefits 
may be acceptable to more countries and thereby generate efficiency gains. 
Assuming either full or partial internalization of mutual benefits, the theoretical 
literature has not paid so much attention to the question how signatories determine 
their abatement level. Also, the experimental literature on IEA formation which is still 
at the beginning does not explicitly consider the negotiation process. Once the 
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subjects have stated their willingness to be a signatory and implement an IEA, most 
experiments simply exact payoff-maximizing behavior of the signatories. Burger and 
Kolstad (2009) use majority voting to determine the joint action of a coalition. 
However, as the decision is binary, i.e. coalition members either contribute the 
collectively rational amount or the non-cooperative amount to the public good, the 
voting merely determines whether or not the coalition is actually formed. Similarly, 
Kosfeld et al. (2009) apply a unanimity rule to determine whether or not a coalition is 
formed. If a coalition is formed, members are required to contribute the collectively 
rational amount to the public good. McEvoy et al. (forthcoming) use a minimum 
participation threshold to determine whether an agreement is actually reached. The 
threshold is set at the theoretically stable coalition size. If an agreement is reached, all 
signatories automatically contribute the collectively rational amount to the public 
good. The latter two experiments also contain treatments in which signatories are not 
bound to comply with the terms of the agreement. Non-compliant signatories in these 
treatments face a sanction (in absolute or expected values) which is supposed to deter 
such behavior. However, none of the above mentioned experiments offer signatories 
the opportunity to negotiate and to agree on a (possibly suboptimal) effort level. In 
contrast, Dannenberg et al. (2010) consider an IEA where signatories can agree on the 
smallest common denominator. More precisely, after the decision to participate in an 
IEA, each signatory suggests a minimum abatement level. The smallest proposal is 
then binding minimum for all signatories. The signatories in this treatment negotiate 
an abatement level below the collectively optimal level. Thereby this ‘smallest 
common denominator treaty’ can attract more participants and generate efficiency 
gains compared to the treatments in which the internalization of mutual benefits is 
exogenously enforced.  
The experiment is also related to a number of recent studies dealing with the theme of 
how institutions can improve efficiency in social dilemmas. The first branch of this 
literature studies the self-selection of individuals into groups with an exogenously 
given institution. These experiments demonstrate that individuals voting with their 
feet between different institutional frameworks can considerably increase efficiency 
in public goods provision (Gürerk et al. 2006, Rockenbach and Milinski 2006). The 
second branch considers fixed groups that self-select the institution that shall apply to 
their interaction. These studies show that endogenously imposed institutions work 
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better than identical but exogenously imposed institutions (Tyran and Feld 2006, 
Sutter et al. 2010). However, neither of the two approaches captures the provision of 
transnational or global public goods. In these cases the group of countries concerned 
is fixed and due to countries’ sovereignty they cannot be forced to accept institutional 
decisions of a majority or even to take part in the negotiations.  
The present study experimentally analyzes the welfare effects if signatories to an IEA 
apply majority voting to determine the minimum abatement level. To this end, I 
consider qualified majority voting and simple majority voting, and compare the 
resulting abatement levels with those achieved by the smallest common denominator 
treaty (described above) where signatories apply a unanimity rule to determine their 
effort level. Furthermore, I compare these IEA treatments with a standard voluntary 
contribution mechanism and institutions in which participation in negotiations of a 
minimum provision level is exogenous. At first sight in line with theoretical 
predictions, the experiment shows that the change of the voting scheme implemented 
in an IEA does not significantly change social welfare. However, changing the 
majority required to determine the terms of an IEA alters the ‘depth and breadth’ of 
cooperation. Under the unanimity rule, coalitions are relatively large and implement 
moderate effort levels while the coalitions with majority votes implement very high 
effort levels but attract only few participants. 
While the experimental game is designed to incorporate key real-world issues, such as 
the voluntary formation of an IEA and negotiations of the IEA terms, it is necessarily 
simplistic for the sake of control and tractability. In particular, the experimental 
subjects face exogenously specified voting schemes, whereas these institutions in 
real-world negotiations evolve endogenously. Furthermore, just like in most of the 
theoretical and experimental literature, signatories to an IEA are assumed (and forced) 
to comply with the IEA terms.1 While the former assumption can be expected to 
hamper cooperation, as endogenous institutional choice has been shown to enhance 
cooperation, the latter is certainly an important precondition for cooperation. There 
are, however, arguments to justify this assumption. For example, customary 
international law may require full compliance by signatories and the enforcement of 
                                                 
1 As mentioned before, some experimental studies (MyEvoy et al. forthcoming, Kosfeld et al. 2009) 
allow for non-compliance in the contribution stage. However, they enforce the implementation of 
sanctions; thus in a broader sense, they do assume compliance. 
- 3 - 
custom could be assumed to be solved outside the model in some kind of meta game 
(Barrett 2003). 
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides the theoretical background. The 
experimental design is laid out in section 3. Section 4 presents the results and section 
5 concludes.  
 
2. Theoretical background 
The game underlying the experiment is standard in the IEA literature (e.g. Barrett 
1994, Carraro and Siniscalco 1993). A world is considered with  identical 
countries which emit a pollutant that damages a global environmental resource. Each 
country’s abatement costs are assumed to depend only on its own abatement level 
while benefits are assumed to depend on global abatement. For country i , the welfare 
function is set by 
1,...,i = n
2/2
1 i
n
j ji
qcqb∑ = −=π       (1) 
where  is s abatement with ,  denotes the constant marginal 
abatement benefits, and  represents the slope of each country’s marginal 
abatement cost curve. The full cooperative abatement level which maximizes social 
welfare is given by 
iq 'i ],0[
max
ii qq ∈ 0>b
0>c
cbnqi /* =  
while the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium is given by 
cbqNCi /= . 
The Nash equilibrium involves dominant strategies such that each country’s actions 
do not depend on the abatement levels chosen by the remaining countries. 
Throughout, interior solutions are assumed which require  to be sufficiently 
large. 
max
iq
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IEA modeling and voting rules 
The modeling of an IEA in this setting generally involves three stages: In the first 
stage, each country chooses to be a signatory or a non-signatory. Let  be the set of 
signatories with 
S
kS =  and nk ≤≤1
cb /
. In the second stage, signatories negotiate a 
minimum abatement level for all IEA members. Negotiations proceed in a way that all 
signatories anonymously vote on minimum abatement levels, starting from the level 
that fully internalizes the mutual benefits, , and decreasing until the 
required majority of signatories agrees with a certain abatement level. This level, 
, is then the binding minimum abatement level for all signatories. In the third 
stage, the individual abatement is chosen. Non-signatories are free to choose any 
abatement level. Their payoff-maximizing decision does not depend on the IEA effort 
and is again given by q , i.e. they completely free-ride. The choice of the 
abatement by the signatories depends on the negotiations inside the IEA. Three 
different voting rules are considered, namely unanimity, three quarter majority, and 
simple majority.  
cbkqi /
min =
minq
NC
i =
In the experiment negotiations are initiated by requesting all signatories to suggest a 
minimum abatement level. After these minimum proposals  are received from all 
participating parties, the agreement will require all signatories to provide at least (i) 
the smallest suggested level  (unanimity), (ii) the suggested level  
upon which three quarter of signatories agree by proposing this or a higher minimum 
level (three quarter majority), or (iii) the suggested level  upon which more than 
half of signatories agree by proposing this or a higher minimum level (simple 
majority). In all three IEA treatments signatories are bound to provide . 
min
iq
min
i
minmin iSi q∈
min
iq
q
minqqi ≥
The individually welfare-maximizing abatement level at this last stage is given by 
. That is, signatories provide exactly the binding minimum as long 
as  is valid. This implies that it is weakly dominant to suggest a minimum 
abatement level of . Suggesting a smaller level would potentially lower 
the binding minimum and thus negatively affect all payoffs. However, there are many 
other equilibria in weakly dominated strategies. In case of unanimity, any binding 
minimum  is established as equilibrium if at least two players suggest that 
]/,max[ min cbqqi =
cbq /min ≥
bkq /min <
cbkqi /
min =
c
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level while all other players suggest a larger minimum. Changing the voting rule only 
changes the number of equilibria in weakly dominated strategies. For example, if the 
simple majority is sufficient to implement the binding minimum abatement level 
inside the IEA, any binding minimum  is established as equilibrium if at 
least  players suggest that level, while the remaining players suggest a larger 
minimum. Any such equilibrium under the simple majority rule is also an equilibrium 
under the unanimity rule while equilibria under unanimity need not to be equilibria 
under simple majority. Hence, the unanimity rule generates more equilibria in weakly 
dominated strategies. In general, the larger the required majority the higher the 
number of weakly dominated equilibria. 
cbkq /min <
c/
15.0 +k
This logic immediately implies that the minimum stage played for all players, i.e. 
participation in negotiations of a minimum abatement level is exogenous, generates 
the full cooperative outcome, bnqi* = , in weakly dominant strategies. 
 
Participation decision 
The decision about the abatement level inside the IEA leads to specific incentives for 
countries to participate. We can denote the payoff to signatories given the number of 
participants  by  and the payoffs to non-signatories by . Using the 
terminology from the IEA literature, a coalition of size  is externally stable if no 
non-signatory has an incentive to join unilaterally, i.e. if ∏ .
k
() ∏≥k NS
)(kS∏
)1
)(kNS∏
() ∏> kS
k
)1( +kNS 2 The 
IEA is internally stable if no signatory has an incentive to leave unilaterally, i.e. if 
.  ( −∏S k
The payoffs in the stage following the participation decision depend on whether the 
countries are able to fully internalize the mutual benefits of the IEA participants, i.e. 
whether they choose the weakly dominant strategy or not. The effect of partial 
internalization has been studied by Finus and Maus (2008). They define an 
internalization ratio α  with 10 ≤<α . That is, the effort level for each signatory is 
. Using the concept of internal and external stability reveals that an ckqSi /( bk), αα =
                                                 
2 It is assumed that a country joins the IEA if it is indifferent to being a signatory or non-signatory as 
this increases payoffs to all other countries. 
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IEA that is internally and externally stable satisfies α
α232 −+≤k  and 
α
α2321 −+>+k .  
For an IEA that fully internalizes mutual benefits ( 1α = ), this implies that only 3 
countries participate ( ). Figure 1 shows how the predicted number of 
participants depends on 
3k =
α . The decreasing relation corresponds to a trade-off 
between the depth and the breadth of cooperation. For example, an IEA with  
signatories could be stabilized for 
6k =
0.5α =  while only 3 countries form an IEA for 
1α = . The broad but shallow treaty can thereby generate efficiency gains. The 
example of  and 6k = 0.5α =  illustrates this result: compared to the  solution if 3k =
1α = , the same total abatement level results while the abatement efforts are being 
distributed across more countries. Due to the increasing marginal abatement costs, 
gains in total payoffs result.  
Since the weakly dominant strategy in the stage following the participation decision 
involves full internalization of mutual benefits, the unique subgame perfect 
equilibrium in weakly dominant strategies implies 3k = . However, it is not clear that 
the signatories will choose the weakly dominant strategy at the minimum stage, which 
might result in less than full internalization. Consequently, any participation level 
could be in principal stabilized in a subgame perfect equilibrium in weakly dominated 
strategies. This generally applies to all voting systems. 
 
3. Experimental Design 
The experiment was designed to investigate the effects of different voting schemes on 
voluntary IEA formation and cooperation. All treatments involved a ten-person public 
good game. The payoff function for each player was given by  
with , , ,  and was common knowledge. 
2/2
1 i
n
j ji
qcqb∑ = −=π
10=b 2=c 10=n ]100,...,0[∈iq
The traditional voluntary contribution mechanism (“VCM”) served as a control 
treatment which only contained a contribution stage where players chose their 
abatement level. The IEA treatments involved three stages. In the first stage subjects 
decided on participating in an IEA (participation stage). Decisions to join or abstain 
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from an IEA were made simultaneously and independently. In the second stage, after 
being told the number of participants, all signatories negotiated the minimum amount 
that each member should abate (minimum stage). Negotiations took the form that all 
participants simultaneously and independently proposed a minimum abatement 
between 0 and 100. In the treatment called “IEAmin” the smallest proposed amount 
became the binding lower limit for the signatories’ abatement. In the treatment 
“IEAqual_maj” the proposed amount on which three quarter of signatories could 
agree by suggesting this or a higher abatement level became binding minimum. In the 
treatment called “IEAsimple_maj” the proposal on which the simple majority of 
signatories could agree by suggesting this or a higher amount became binding 
minimum. In all three IEA treatments, signatories were informed about all proposed 
minimum amounts (arranged in descending order). Non-signatories did not make any 
decision at this stage and were only informed about the number of signatories. In the 
third stage, the contribution stage, signatories and non-signatories chose their 
abatement. While non-signatories could freely choose their abatement level, 
signatories were bound to provide at least the binding minimum.  
Finally, three treatments were implemented in which all subjects took part in the 
negotiations about a minimum abatement level. In these treatments, all players first 
simultaneously and independently proposed a minimum amount between 0 and 100. 
In the treatment called “VCMmin” the smallest proposed amount became the binding 
lower limit for the abatement of all players. In the treatment “VCMqual_maj” the 
proposed amount upon which three quarter of players could agree by suggesting this 
or a higher provision level became binding minimum. In the treatment called 
“VCMsimple_maj” the proposal upon which the simple majority of players could 
agree by suggesting this or a higher amount became binding minimum. In all three 
treatments, players were informed about all proposed minimum amounts (arranged in 
descending order). In the contribution stage, all players simultaneously and 
independently determined their abatement, which had to be equal or greater than the 
binding minimum.3  
Table 1 summarizes the key features of the experimental design and the number of 
subjects in each session. The experiment was run in July and October 2009 at the 
MaxLab laboratory at the University of Magdeburg, Germany. In total, 700 students 
                                                 
3 The treatments VCM, VCMmin, and IEAmin are also used in Dannenberg et al. (2010). 
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participated in the experiment, of which 100 took part in each treatment (recruiting 
software Orsee, Greiner 2004). 
Twenty subjects took part in each session. Each subject was seated at linked computer 
terminals that were used to transmit all decision and payoff information (software 
Ztree, Fischbacher 2007). Once the individuals were seated and logged into the 
terminals, a set of instructions and a record sheet were handed out. Experimental 
instructions included several numerical examples and control questions in order to 
ensure that all subjects understood the game (see appendix for experimental 
instructions). The sessions each consisted of 12 rounds, the first two being practice. 
The subjects were instructed that the practice rounds would not affect earnings.  
At the beginning of the experiment subjects were randomly assigned to groups of ten. 
The subjects were not aware of whom they were grouped with, but they did know that 
they remained within the same group of players throughout the rounds (partner 
matching). At the end of the experiment, one of the non-practice rounds was 
randomly selected as the round that would determine earnings. Sessions lasted 
between 60 and 90 minutes. On average, a subject earned €15.82 in the games. 
Additionally, all subjects received €1.00 as show-up fee.4 
 
4. Experimental Results 
Decision on abatement levels 
To compare the various treatments, abatement and payoff levels are averaged over all 
players and rounds. Table 2 provides mean abatement and payoff levels for each 
treatment and Figure 2 provides a graphical depiction of the data. The first panel 
presents the average abatement levels and the second reports the resulting average 
payoff levels. Average abatement levels in the three IEA treatments – IEAmin, 
IEAqual_maj, and IEAsimple_maj – slightly exceed those in the standard VCM. The 
VCM games with minimum stage – VCMmin, VCMqual_maj, and VCMsimple_maj – 
clearly increase average abatement compared to the standard VCM. These differences 
are confirmed by a series of Mann-Whitney tests with the average abatement level of 
one group across all periods being taken as the unit of observation: VCM gives lower 
                                                 
4 Overall, 19 out of 700 subjects earned negative payoffs in the games. In these cases, payoffs were cut 
off at zero and the subjects only received the show-up fee. 
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abatement levels than VCMmin, VCMqual_maj, and VCMsimple_maj (10%, 10%, and 
1% significance respectively). VCM also gives lower abatement levels than IEAmin, 
IEAqual_maj, and IEAsimple_maj (10%, 10%, and 1% significance). As illustrated in 
Table 2 and Figure 2, reducing the majority required to implement the minimum 
abatement level leads to considerable increases of average abatement in the VCM 
games with minimum stage while the increases in the IEA treatments are only minor. 
Using Mann-Whitney tests confirms that abatement in VCMsimple_maj is higher than 
in VCMqual_maj (1% significance) and abatement in VCMqual_maj is higher than in 
VCMmin (1% significance). In contrast, there are no significant differences between 
IEAmin and IEAqual_maj as well as between IEAqual_maj and IEAsimple_maj. 
IEAsimple_maj performs slightly better than IEAmin (10% significance). Identical 
comparisons follow for the average payoff level, i.e. the efficiency of the respective 
institutions.  
Result 1: All institutions under review perform better than the standard 
voluntary contribution mechanism (VCM). Reducing the majority 
required to implement a minimum abatement level leads to high 
efficiency gains when negotiations involve all agents. Efficiency gains 
are substantially smaller when the majority decision only applies to 
signatories to an IEA. 
Result 1 is confirmed by the linear regression models presented in Tables 3 and 4. 
Figure 3 shows the development of average abatement levels for all treatments over 
time. The contributions in VCM are decreasing over time (see also Table 2). This 
downward trend, which has been observed in many other public goods experiments, is 
also observable for the three IEA treatments. The contributions in the VCM games 
with minimum stage, in contrast, follow an upward trend. This suggests that 
predictions from the theory hold: irrespective of the voting scheme, the possibility to 
form an IEA provides only small benefits compared to the voluntary contribution 
mechanism while negotiations of minimum abatement levels, including all agents, 
provide considerable efficiency gains. 
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Decision on participation and benefit internalization 
In the following, I will have a closer look at the three IEA treatments. Figure 4 (left 
panel) shows the average abatement of signatories compared to that of non-
signatories. As expected, non-signatories’ abatement levels are clearly lower than 
those of signatories. However, the incentives for non-signatories to free-ride seem to 
decrease with higher effort levels of the IEA. The right panel in Figure 4 shows the 
differences in the number of signatories across IEA treatments. While in IEAmin on 
average half of all players form an IEA (5.07), the number of signatories is 
significantly lower in IEAqual_maj (3.68) and IEAsimple_maj (3.56) (Mann Whitney 
test, 5% and 1% significance respectively). This is confirmed by a probit estimation 
model of the decision to join the IEA as presented in Table 5. Players in IEAmin are 
more likely to join than in IEAqual_maj or IEAsimple_maj. Moreover, the estimation 
model shows that players are more likely to join if they already have been a signatory 
in the previous round. They are less likely to join if the IEA in the previous round has 
agreed on a relatively high minimum abatement level. Figure 5 shows the average 
number of signatories over time. While this number in IEAmin is relatively stable at 
around 5, the number of signatories in the IEA treatments with majority decision 
converges towards 3 over time. 
Result 2: The incentives to join an IEA are significantly smaller if the 
IEA decides by majority vote than by unanimity. Moreover a high 
minimum abatement level reduces the incentives to join an IEA in the 
next round. 
The next point of interest is the level of abatement the signatories can agree upon. A 
sensible measure to assess the abatement level in the IEA is the internalization ratio, 
i.e. the ratio of the chosen abatement level compared with the payoff-maximizing 
level, . On average the ratio is 83% for IEAmin, 132% for 
IEAqual_maj, and 167% for IEAsimple_maj as illustrated in Figure 6. Interestingly, 
while signatories in IEAmin do not fully internalize their mutual benefits, signatories 
in the two IEA treatments with majority decision ‘overinternalize’ mutual benefits, 
i.e. they internalize in part also benefits of non-signatories. The internalization ratio 
depends on the number of signatories. Figure 7 shows that in all three treatments the 
internalization ratios based on actual abatement levels are decreasing in . The actual 
)//( 2 cbkq
Si i∑=
k
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internalization ratios can be compared with the internalization ratio needed to stabilize 
a given coalition size as derived in section 2 (see Figures 1 and 7). The internalization 
ratios in IEAmin closely follow these stabilization levels. In contrast, in the IEA 
treatments with majority decision, the internalization ratios always exceed the 
stabilization levels; they approach 100% with increasing number of signatories (see 
Figure 7). 
Result 3: Majority voting changes the type of an IEA: while unanimity 
leads to ‘broad but rather shallow’ agreements, majority votes produce 
‘narrow but very deep’ agreements. 
 
Decision on minimum abatement proposals 
The decision on the binding minimum level is particularly important since the agents’ 
abatement levels are, as predicted, highly sensitive to the required minimum. In fact, 
80% of contribution decisions in the VCM treatments with minimum stage and also 
80% of signatories’ decisions on contributions in the IEA treatments are exactly at the 
minimum level. It is therefore evident that those players, whose suggestions form the 
binding minimum, have a large impact on the total abatement.  
As distinct prediction from the theory described above is that agents in both the VCM 
treatments with minimum stage and the IEA treatments have a weakly dominant 
strategy to suggest the minimum which fully internalizes mutual benefits. We have 
already seen that the internalization depends on the voting rule and whether 
negotiations involve all players or a subset of players. I finally address the question 
whether agents adjust their minimum proposals to the prevailing voting rule. It might 
be, for example, that subjects anticipate the risk of being outvoted and therefore adjust 
their minimum proposals downwardly. Table 6 presents the results of a linear 
regression of the internalization levels of individual minimum proposals. For the 
VCM treatments with minimum stage a variable “int_qimin” is defined which reflects 
how far a player’s suggestion internalizes mutual benefits. For the IEA treatments, the 
variable “int_qimin_IEA” reflects how far signatories’ suggestions internalize mutual 
benefits of the IEA participants. In both the VCM treatments with minimum stage and 
the IEA treatments, the internalization level is higher for subjects who already have 
submitted larger proposals in the previous round. In the VCM treatments with 
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minimum stage, the internalization of the individual minimum proposals increases 
over time. Thus, subjects learn from experience to propose minimum levels that 
increase efficiency. In the IEA treatments the internalization decreases with larger 
coalitions. Interestingly, the introduction of majority voting does not significantly 
affect the internalization level of minimum suggestions. Thus, compared to unanimity 
majority voting does not change individual minimum suggestions but merely the 
outcome of the negotiations. 
Result 4: Irrespective of whether negotiations involve all players or 
only a subset of players, the voting rule does not affect the individual 
minimum proposals but merely the outcome of the negotiations.  
 
5. Conclusions 
In this paper I experimentally analyze the welfare effects if signatories to an IEA 
apply majority voting to determine the terms of the agreement. To this end, I consider 
qualified majority voting and simple majority voting, and compare the resulting 
pollution abatement levels with those achieved by the smallest common denominator 
treaty in which signatories apply a unanimity rule to determine their effort level. At 
first sight in line with theoretical predictions, the experiment shows that a change of 
the voting scheme implemented in an IEA does not significantly change social 
welfare. However, changing the majority required to determine the terms of an IEA 
alters the depth and breadth of cooperation. The coalitions under the unanimity rule 
are relatively large and implement moderate effort levels, while the coalitions with 
majority votes implement very high effort levels but attract only few participants. 
The institutions which exogenously bring together all players to negotiate a minimum 
public good provision level perform much better than the insider-outsider structure 
created by an IEA. In this case, the reduction of the majority required to determine the 
minimum provision level leads to substantial efficiency gains. Why do the majority 
votes provide efficiency gains when all players are involved in negotiations but not 
when only a subgroup of countries negotiates? The qualified majority rule and the 
simple majority rule – as implemented in this setting – necessarily increase the 
binding minimum abatement level (or do not change it) compared to unanimity. 
Therefore, as long as all players have to comply with the minimum contribution and 
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the minimum is equal or less than the socially optimal level, majority decisions 
increase the benefits of the group and each player (or do not change them). The 
reason for this is that most players exactly contribute the minimum provision level 
and do not go beyond. Therefore, the majority votes effectively reduce the sensitivity 
of the unanimity rule with respect to low minimum proposals. The experiment shows 
that this property is relevant, even if agents are symmetric, i.e. if they have the same 
payoff function.  
This is different if only a subgroup of countries negotiates. First, raising the binding 
minimum contribution level for coalition members increases the members’ payoffs 
only until mutual benefits are fully internalized. After this point an increasing 
minimum level may increase the group payoff but reduces the member payoff. Since 
the unanimity rule already generates an internalization ratio of over 80%, the scope 
for efficiency gains inside the coalition due to majority votes is small. Second, higher 
internalization ratios reduce the incentives to join the coalition, in particular when 
they are above 100% as observed in this experiment. Therefore, efficiency gains 
through higher internalization ratios are negated by smaller coalitions. Finally, the 
inequality manifested by the coalition structure between members and non-members 
combined with the members’ risk of being outvoted may additionally reduce 
incentives to join the coalition when agents have some kind of fairness preferences 
(e.g. Fehr and Schmidt 1999).  
The experimental results have implications for public policy. First, the results confirm 
that the terms of institutionalizing the requirements from an IEA are crucial for the 
capacity to attract signatories. Countries should be aware of the trade-off between the 
depth and breadth of cooperation. The most recent United Nations Climate Change 
Conference in Copenhagen in December 2009 may serve as an example. As part of 
the resulting agreement, the Copenhagen Accord, some countries offer ranges of 
emissions reduction targets with the more stringent targets being conditional on other 
countries’ actions. For example, the European Union pledged an unconditional 20% 
reduction by 2020 compared to 1990 and a 30% reduction contingent on comparable 
emissions reductions by other developed countries.5 The meaning of ‘comparable’ 
emissions reductions is not obvious. However, given the fact that the economic 
                                                 
5 See http://unfccc.int/home/items/5264.php (accessed in August 2010). 
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consequences of the Accord pledges vary significantly between countries,6 
comparability of efforts might imply more stringent targets for certain countries. 
While making offers conditional on others’ efforts seems to be a good strategy to 
implement a kind of minimum contribution for a number of countries, insisting on too 
ambitious targets is likely to deter some countries from joining the coalition. 
Therefore, inducing these countries to accept moderate reduction targets may be a 
more promising way than ambitious but unilateral efforts. Such unilateral efforts may 
merely crowd out other countries’ contributions and therefore subsidize free-riders as 
observed in the experiment. 
The second implication is more general. The theoretical IEA literature mostly 
assumes that countries only care about their self-interest.7 The experimental coalition 
formation studies provide some insight to the consequences arising from real (and 
possibly other-regarding) preferences. Similar to the standard public goods games 
they show that people in the lab do not always act in line with the theory, but all the 
same, they are still far away from the social optimum. Though Kosfeld et al. (2009) 
show that the grand coalition is particularly compelling for small groups (n=4), larger 
groups in other experiments (n=10) rarely implemented the grand coalition. Relative 
to the difference between the full cooperative and the non-cooperative outcome, the 
average achieved efficiency gain often ranges between 20% and 50% and decreases 
with periods of repeated play. On average, the subjects in the present analysis 
achieved an efficiency gain of 29-39% which decreased to 17-24% in the final round. 
It remains an open question which approach, the theoretical or the experimental 
approach, is more suitable to capture the ‘preferences’ of countries. However, both 
approaches indicate that under certain circumstances, first-best solutions are not 
available. In this respect, the experimental results so far tend to support the view that 
small changes in the design of a particular IEA might not be enough but more radical 
changes might be needed (see e.g. Barrett 2002, 2008 for climate treaties).  
As already pointed out in the introduction, the experimental coalition formation 
literature is in need of further development and therefore the picture is still 
                                                 
6 For an assessment with domestically achievement of targets only see McKibbin et al. 2010; for an 
assessment with limited use of an international carbon market see 
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/pdf/26-05-2010working_doc2.pdf (accessed in August 2010). 
7 Exceptions are for instance Lange and Vogt (2003) and Lange (2006). 
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incomplete. Promising areas for further research include asymmetric actors, 
endogenous institution design, and non-compliance. 
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Table 1. Summary of experimental design 
Treatment Stages IEA n  b  c  No. of subjects 
VCM contribution no 10 10 2 100 
VCMmin minimum 
contribution 
 
no 10 10 2 100 
VCMqual_maj minimum 
contribution 
 
no 10 10 2 100 
VCMsimple_maj minimum 
contribution 
 
no 10 10 2 100 
IEAmin participation 
minimum 
contribution 
 
yes 10 10 2 100 
IEAqual_maj participation 
minimum 
contribution 
 
yes 10 10 2 100 
IEAsimple_maj participation 
minimum 
contribution 
yes 10 10 2 100 
 
 
Table 2. Summary statistics for all treatments 
Treatment Total First 5 rounds Last 5 rounds 
q  π  k  q  π  k  q  π  k  
VCM 12.3 905.2  15.7 1098.4  8.9 711.9  
VCMmin 22.1 1418.6  16.8 1187.9  27.5 1649.2  
VCMqual_maj 41.4 2296.0  38.3 2221.6  44.4 2370.5  
VCMsimple_maj 48.5 2447.3  48.2 2436.8  48.8 2457.8  
IEAmin 14.8 1060.1 5.1 16.32 1160.1 5.3 13.4 960.1 4.8 
IEAqual_maj 15.7 1107.0 3.7 17.8 1200.6 3.9 13.6 1013.5 3.5 
IEAsimple_maj 18.9 1235.8 3.6 22.8 1430.4 4 15.1 1041.1 3.1 
Notes: q  = average contributions, π  = average payoffs, k  = average number of signatories 
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Table 3. Linear regression of abatement levels for all treatments 
 Round 1-10 Round 1-10 Round 6-10
VARIABLES qi qi qi 
    
VCMmin 9.833*** 9.833*** 18.62*** 
 (3.249) (3.250) (4.468) 
VCMqm 29.07*** 29.07*** 35.58*** 
 (1.968) (1.968) (1.546) 
VCMsm 36.21*** 36.21*** 39.95*** 
 (1.251) (1.251) (1.017) 
IEAmin 2.551** 2.551** 4.520*** 
 (1.007) (1.007) (1.364) 
IEAqm 3.360** 3.360** 4.698*** 
 (1.678) (1.678) (1.459) 
IEAsm 6.644*** 6.644*** 6.194*** 
 (1.655) (1.655) (1.261) 
round6_10  -0.625  
  (1.081)  
Constant 12.30*** 12.61*** 8.858*** 
 (0.613) (0.841) (0.591) 
    
Observations 7000 7000 3500 
Number of groups 700 700 700 
Wald chi2 3517.17*** 3621.96*** 5121.66***
Notes: Random effects estimation clustered at group level, standard errors in 
parentheses,  
significance *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Definition of variables: 
qi = subject’s abatement, 
VCMmin = 1 if subject plays in the VCMmin treatment, 0 otherwise, 
VCMqm = 1 if subject plays in the VCMqual_maj treatment, 0 otherwise, 
VCMsm = 1 if subject plays in the VCMsimple_maj treatment, 0 otherwise, 
IEAmin = 1 if subject plays in the IEAmin treatment, 0 otherwise, 
IEAqm = 1 if subject plays in the IEAqual_maj treatment, 0 otherwise, 
IEAsm = 1 if subject plays in the IEAsimple_maj treatment, 0 otherwise, 
round6_10 = 1 for the last five rounds, 0 for the first five rounds. 
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Table 4. Linear regression of payoff levels for all treatments 
 Round 1-10 Round 1-10 Round 6-10
VARIABLES pay pay pay 
    
VCMmin 513.4*** 513.4*** 937.3*** 
 (164.9) (164.9) (216.6) 
VCMqm 1391*** 1391*** 1659*** 
 (70.63) (70.63) (66.43) 
VCMsm 1542*** 1542*** 1746*** 
 (56.39) (56.40) (55.53) 
IEAmin 154.9*** 154.9*** 248.2*** 
 (58.64) (58.64) (81.78) 
IEAqm 201.9** 201.9** 301.6*** 
 (93.51) (93.52) (89.55) 
IEAsm 330.6*** 330.6*** 329.2*** 
 (75.75) (75.76) (65.83) 
round6_10  -75.96  
  (50.01)  
Constant 905.2*** 943.2*** 711.9*** 
 (42.46) (49.67) (42.10) 
    
Observations 7000 7000 3500 
Number of groups 700 700 700 
Wald chi2 7789.81*** 7817.35*** 7855.15***
Notes: Random effects estimation clustered at group level, standard errors in 
parentheses,  
significance *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Definition of variables: 
pay = subject’s payoff level, 
VCMmin = 1 if subject plays in the VCMmin treatment, 0 otherwise, 
VCMqm = 1 if subject plays in the VCMqual_maj treatment, 0 otherwise, 
VCMsm = 1 if subject plays in the VCMsimple_maj treatment, 0 otherwise, 
IEAmin = 1 if subject plays in the IEAmin treatment, 0 otherwise, 
IEAqm = 1 if subject plays in the IEAqual_maj treatment, 0 otherwise, 
IEAsm = 1 if subject plays in the IEAsimple_maj treatment, 0 otherwise, 
round6_10 = 1 for the last five rounds, 0 for the first five rounds. 
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Table 5. Probit estimation of participation decision for all IEA treatments 
 Round 1-10 Round 1-10 
VARIABLES ci ci 
   
ci_lag 1.255*** 1.268*** 
 (0.0572) (0.0590) 
k_lag 0.00442 0.00545 
 (0.0172) (0.0172) 
IEAqm -0.152** -0.144** 
 (0.0684) (0.0691) 
IEAsm -0.213*** -0.198*** 
 (0.0717) (0.0736) 
int_min_IEA_lag -0.0941*** -0.0938*** 
 (0.0286) (0.0285) 
outvoted_lag  -0.111 
  (0.123) 
Constant -0.612*** -0.624*** 
 (0.0976) (0.0985) 
   
Observations 2650 2650 
Pseudo R-squared 0.185 0.185 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses,  
significance *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Definition of variables: 
ci = 1 if subject participates in IEA, 0 otherwise, 
ci_lag = 1 if subject participated in the previous round, 0 otherwise, 
k_lag = coalition size in the previous round, 
IEAqm = 1 if subject plays in the IEAqual_maj treatment, 0 otherwise, 
IEAsm = 1 if subject plays in the IEAsimple_maj treatment, 0 otherwise, 
int_min_IEA_lag = previous round internalization ratio based on the binding 
minimum, 
outvoted_lag = 1 if subject’s minimum proposal in previous round was below the 
binding minimum, 0 otherwise. 
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Table 6. Linear regression of internalization ratios of individual minimum proposals 
 VCM with 
minimum 
IEA with 
minimum 
VARIABLES int_qimin int_qimin_IEA 
   
qi_min_lag 0.0117*** 0.0206*** 
 (0.000628) (0.00264) 
q_min_lag -0.00130* -0.00195 
 (0.000759) (0.00288) 
round6_10 0.0275*** 0.00490 
 (0.00998) (0.0521) 
k  -0.135*** 
  (0.0230) 
IEAqm  0.0820 
  (0.0944) 
IEAsm  0.0356 
  (0.0937) 
VCMqm 0.0110  
 (0.0228)  
VCMsm 0.00552  
 (0.0286)  
Constant 0.421*** 1.425*** 
 (0.0310) (0.176) 
   
Observations 2700 763 
Number of groups 300 186 
Wald chi2 48,883.76*** 134.83*** 
Notes: Random effects estimation clustered at group level, standard errors in 
parentheses,  
significance *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Definition of variables: 
int_qimin = internalization ratio of subject’s minimum proposal in VCM treatments 
int_qimin_IEA = internalization ratio of subject’s minimum proposal in IEA 
treatments 
qi_min_lag = subject’s minimum proposal in the previous round, 
q_min_lag = binding minimum in the previous round, 
k = coalition size, 
round6_10 = 1 for the last five rounds, 0 for the first five rounds, 
VCMqm = 1 if subject plays in the VCMqual_maj treatment, 0 otherwise, 
VCMsm = 1 if subject plays in the VCMsimple_maj treatment, 0 otherwise, 
IEAqm = 1 if subject plays in the IEAqual_maj treatment, 0 otherwise, 
IEAsm = 1 if subject plays in the IEAsimple_maj treatment, 0 otherwise. 
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Figure 1. Internalization factor α  needed to stabilize a given coalition size 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Average abatement and payoff levels for all treatments 
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Figure 3. Average abatement levels for all treatments over time 
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Figure 4. Average abatement levels among signatories and non-signatories and 
average coalition size across IEA treatments 
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Figure 5. Average coalition size across all IEA treatments over time 
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Figure 6. Average internalization ratios across IEA treatments (fraction of benefits 
that is internalized) and average coalition size 
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Figure 7. Average internalization ratios conditional on coalition size across the IEA 
treatments (the line “int_ratio_needed” shows the internalization ratios theoretically 
needed to achieve the respective coalition size) 
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Appendix 
Experimental instructions for the IEAmin treatment 
 
Instructions 
Welcome to the Magdeburg Experimental Laboratory MAXLAB! 
Please read these instructions carefully and should you have any questions please 
signal us by opening the door or a show of hands. In the laboratory experiment you 
are taking part in, you can win money depending on your decisions and the decisions 
of your fellow players. Your payout from the experiment will be calculated in 
LabDollars (LD). The conversion rate between € and LD is 1:100, i.e. 100 LD are €1. 
All your decisions made the experiment will remain anonymous. Only the 
experimenter will know your identity, but your data will be treated confidentially. 
Rules of the game 
Now you will learn more about the rules of the game you will be participating in. 
Altogether 10 players take part in the game, so besides you there are 9 more players. 
Every participant faces the same decision making problem. Your task in the game, 
and also your fellow players’ task, is to decide how many points (between 0 and 100) 
you would like to contribute to a joint project. Your payout will be calculated as 
follows: 
Your payout = −(your contribution to the project)2 + 10⋅(sum of all contributions of 
all players to the project) 
Example: If all other players have contributed an amount of 90 points to the project 
and you contribute an amount of 10 points, then your payout will be: 
− (10)2 + 10⋅(10+90) = 900 LD 
If, however, all other players contribute a total amount of 50 points and you do not 
contribute anything, your payout will be: 
− (0)2 + 10⋅(0+50) = 500 LD 
To simplify the calculation of your payout, you will find an excel-file called 
“Simulator” on your screen. You can enter your contribution and the average 
contribution of all other players and so quickly determine your payout. 
There are two stages in this game. In stage 1 you can decide whether you want to 
become a member of a coalition, i.e. if you want to join a coalition or not. Should you 
decide that you want to join a coalition you additionally can decide which amount 
should be the minimum amount each member of the coalition should contribute to 
the project. Also all other members of the coalition can state their desired minimum 
amount. The members will be informed about the proposals for the minimum amount 
of all members. If you are member of a coalition, stage 2 will be to decide for 
yourself which amount you want to contribute. In this decision the smallest minimum 
amount of all members will form your lower limit of contribution. If you have 
decided not to join a coalition, stage 2 for you will be to state your contribution to the 
project without any limitation. 
The game consists of 10 separate rounds in each of which you will play the same 
two-stage game. The nine other players you will interact with will be the same in 
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every round. If the experiment is complete you will receive the payout of one of the 
rounds in € (according to the conversion rate stated above). The round to be paid out 
will be determined randomly. This means you should behave in each round as if it 
were the round relevant for payout. In the beginning, two trial rounds will be played 
which are not relevant for payout. Independent of the course of the game you will 
receive €1 for your participation.  
 
Control questions 
If you have read the instructions and do not have any questions, please answer the 
following control questions (hint: use the simulator). 
1. Please assume your contribution to the project is 10 points and the average 
contribution of all the other players is 15 points. How much LD will be your 
payout of this round? 
My payout is: _______ 
2. Please assume the average contribution of all other players is 5 points, which 
of the following amounts will result in the highest payout for you? 
O 5 points O 10 points  O 20 points  O 30 points 
3. Please assume you want to maximise your payout, does it make sense to not 
contribute at all (meaning zero points) to the project? 
O yes O no 
4. Please assume you and three other players have joined a coalition and all 
members have stated the following minimum contribution: 4, 88, 22, 56. In 
which range does your contribution to the project have to be? 
More than or equal ____ and less than or equal _____. 
5. Is it possible that a member of a coalition has to contribute more than he 
proposed as his minimum contribution?  
O yes O no 
6. Please assume all players chose the same amount, which of the following 
contributions results in the highest payout for all players (please check the 
according box)? 
O 10 points O 30 points O 50 points O 70 points O 100 points 
 
If you have answered all questions, please signal us. We will then check your 
answers. The game begins when all participants in the experiment have successfully 
completed the test. 
Good luck in the experiment! The MaXLab-Team 
